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INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS, OBJECTIVITY AND THE ELISION 
OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSENT ACHIEVED THOUGH 
CONCESSION AND COMPROMISE 
 
DAVID CABRELLI# 
 
Introduction 
 
To what extent do ‘consent’ and ‘intention’ continue to have a role to play in the 
process of construing the terms of contracts? Is the adoption of an increasingly 
objective approach towards the interpretative process consistent with an assertion that 
it can be equiparated to the marginalisation of the role of consent? If the dynamics of 
concession and compromise in commercial negotiations are facets of party consent, in 
what way may (if at all) the prevalence of the commercially sensible construction 
function to elide consensus?  These are some of the questions which this paper will 
attempt to address. Since contract law is one of the vessels through which voluntary 
obligations are constituted and channelled and a contract involves the exercise by an 
obligor of his will and an expression of his intention to be bound, 1 one might think 
that the consent and intention of obligor and obligee would be fundamentally crucial 
to the construction of the terms encapsulating those obligations and duties. However, 
the courts have routinely stressed that the search for the true construction of the terms 
of written or oral contracts is concerned more about what the reasonable objective 
person would consider the mutual intentions of the parties to be rather than what they 
had intended to agree subjectively (individually or collectively). One of the principal 
merits of the objective approach is said to be that it avoids unjust results generated 
from ‘unfair surprise’ and protects the reasonable reliance interests of the parties to 
the contract and those whose rights, duties and liabilities may be affected by it.2 On 
the other hand, the requirement to construe the terms of a commercial contract from 
                                                 
# Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh. An 
earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop entitled The Role of Consent 
in Contract Law: Principles and Practice which was hosted by the Edinburgh Centre 
for Commercial Law at the University of Edinburgh on 7th December 2009.  
1 The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (Vol. 15), Contract at 
paragraph 4. 
2 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Interpretation in Private Law (The Stationary 
Office, 1997), Scot. Law. Com. No. 160, para. 2.6. 
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the perspective of the objective and disinterested reasonable business outsider leaves 
the current legal position open to the charge that party autonomy and consent is 
unjustifiably overridden. This paper will strive to subject the objective standard to a 
measure of scrutiny and offer insights which serve to identify the implications of its 
application for party autonomy and consent. 
 
The interpretative process in its historical context 
 
The construction of an express term will be a live issue in the case of many contracts 
and can be contrasted with the process of interpretation strictu sensu, the latter 
process being confined to a literal translation whereas construction entails the 
attribution of meaning to words or terms from the spirit of the text.3 First, 
construction will be relevant where it is unclear whether the words which feature in 
the contract include or exclude certain circumstances, examples, factors or matters 
within their scope of application. Farnsworth has referred to this ‘scope’ factor as an 
example of what is referred to as ‘vagueness’ which is distinct from ‘ambiguity’.4  
Words are ‘ambiguous’ where the words are capable of more than one meaning or 
connotation. For example, whether the verb “cast” means ‘throw out’5 or ‘appoint’.6 
Furthermore, as the Scottish Law Commission has pointed out, the word ‘ambiguous’ 
is also used to describe an ‘expression [which] is unclear or uncertain.’7  
 
Through careful analysis of primary sources, Clive has demonstrated that the 
traditional Scottish approach towards the construction of the terms of contracts 
followed a ‘mild’ or ‘weak’ form of subjective approach.8 The judiciary would 
                                                 
3 William W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edition, Edinburgh W 
Green 2007) para. 8-05 at p. 199 and E. Farnsworth, “”Meaning” in the Law of 
Contracts” (1967) 76 Yale LJ 939, 939-940. Whilst respecting the prescience of this 
distinction, for ease of reference, the terms ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ will be 
used interchangeably in this paper. 
4 Farnsworth, “”Meaning” in the Law of Contracts” (1967) 76 Yale LJ 939, 953. See 
also A. Schwartz & R. E. Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law” 
113 Yale Law Journal 541, 570-572 (2003). 
5 As in ‘cast a net’.  
6 As in ‘Noel Coward cast Edward Woodward to play the part of…’. 
7 Scottish Law Commission, Interpretation in Private Law, 1997, para.2.12  
8 Eric Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of 
Private Law in Scotland (Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 2, Chap. 2 at pp. 50-52, Stair, 
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attempt to ascertain the meaning of the terms agreed by the parties in the contract in 
accordance with what the parties thought they had intended to say at the time 
agreement was reached. The subjective approach is consistent with the ‘will theory’, 
i.e. that where there is a dispute, duly reflecting the consensual nature of a contract, 
the interpretative process must be focussed on the need to ascertain the collective 
intentions of the parties.9 However, by the time of Bell’s writings, the interpretative 
process had begun to drift away from a purely subjective approach towards the 
determination of the ‘mutual intentions’10 of the parties. As noted by Sir Christopher 
Staughton, the ascertainment of the parties’ ‘mutual intentions’ ‘does not necessarily 
mean what they [themselves] actually meant’,11 but instead, as Bell noted in his 
Commentaries, it is concerned with the drawing of an: 
 
‘…inference, by the act of reason, or the collecting from proper indications, of the 
true meaning of the parties… [and]… according to the sense in which it was 
mutually understood and relied upon at the time of making it.’12 
 
As explained by Laura Macgregor, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
‘remnants of a subjective approach [we]re difficult to find’13 and Scots law in this 
period is characterised by an incremental gravitation towards an objective approach 
rather than a clearly recognisable and well-defined break from the subjective stance. 
However, the approach could not be categorised as fully 100 per cent objective in 
nature. Thus, before the decision of the House of Lords in Investors Compensation 
                                                                                                                                            
Institutions IV.42.20 and 21, Bankton, Institute IV.45.50; Scottish Law Commission, 
Interpretation in Private Law,1997, para.1.16. 
9 Scottish Law Commission, Interpretation in Private Law, 1997, para.1.14; Clive, 
“Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in 
Scotland, 2000, vol. 2, pp. 50-52. 
10 The limitations of seeking to ascertain the ‘intention’ of a contracting party or the 
‘mutual intentions’ of the contracting parties are explored comprehensively in 
McBryde, Contract, 2007, para.8-03. 
11 Sir C. Staughton, “How do the Courts Interpret Commercial Contracts?” [1999] 
Cambridge Law Journal 303, 305. Writer’s annotations in square brackets. 
12 Bell, Commentaries, I, 455-456 (7th edition from 1870 by M’Laren); 
13 L. MacGregor and C. Lewis, “Interpretation of Contract”, in R. Zimmermann, 
D.Visser and K. Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective 
(Oxford, OUP, 2004), Chap. 3 at p. 69. 
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Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society,14 on one particular reading of the 
position,15 the Scottish courts appeared to be confined to looking at the circumstances 
surrounding the conclusion of the contract where the scope of application of the 
words was unclear, the words were capable of more than one interpretation, or they 
were latently ambiguous, i.e. the words or expressions deployed in the written 
commercial contract appeared to be clear, but the surrounding circumstances pointed 
to the presence of an ambiguity.16 By and large, in the cases decided according to 
Scots law prior to Investors Compensation Scheme the interpretative process was 
generally characterised by references to the natural and ordinary meaning which the 
words employed duly conveyed - which was a matter of ‘impression’17 or dictionary 
definition. In theory at least, the courts were only allowed to look at the factual matrix 
and circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract where it had held that 
the words possessed no plain meaning. 
 
                                                 
14 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 
WLR 896. 
15 See Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd. v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] 
UKSC 47; 2011 SLT 184, 189 at para. [21] per Lord Hope. However, for an 
alternative, more circumspect, view, see E. Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. 
Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 
2, Chap. 2 at pp. 47-49 and the opinion of Lord Drummond Young in the decision of 
the Inner House in Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Ltd. [2010] CSIH 
81; 2010 G.W.D. 37-755 at para. [11], as well as the references to Scottish cases such 
as Bank of Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957, Baird’s Trs. v Baird & Co. (1877) 4 R 
1005, Hunter v Barron’s Trs. (1886) 13 R 883 and Jopp’s Trs. v Edmond (1888) 15 R 
271 in Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s contribution in “A New Thing Under the Sun: The 
Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 
374, 376 and 390. The case of Miller v Mair (1860) 22 D 660 is another example of a 
Scottish case where the surrounding context superseded the ordinary and natural 
meaning of the words and can be added to the Scottish cases of the ilk which Lord 
Bingham referred to in the said article. 
16 See William M. Gloag, Contract, 2nd edn, (Edinburgh: W. Green 1929), pp. 399-
400; Crosse v Bankes (1886) 13 R (HL) 40 at 41, per Lord Halsbury LC where he 
refers to the requirement to read and understand words in their 'ordinary and natural 
sense' as an 'ordinary rule of construction’. See also M W Wilson (Lace) Ltd. v Eagle 
Star Insurance Co. Ltd. 1993 S.L.T. 938 at 942 and 947 per Lord Justice Clerk Ross 
and Lord Kirkwood respectively. However, there is an argument that there is 
something particularly suspect in using ‘context’ to dislodge the clear meaning of 
words to create a latent ambiguity and then to subsequently re-apply the ‘context’ 
again to cure that latent ambiguity. 
17 The word adopted by Lord Justice Clerk Ross and Lord Kirkwood respectively in 
M W Wilson (Lace) Ltd. v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. 1993 S.L.T. 938 at 942 and 
947. 
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Whilst Lord Bingham has argued that Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Investors 
Compensation Scheme was nothing like the sort of departure from the position 
adopted and applied by the common law courts in cases decided according to English 
law or Scots law before 1997,18 it is suggested that whilst there is certainly more than 
a kernel of truth in that contention, something seismic has occurred since 1997. It may 
be more a change of emphasis or mindset as opposed to a real palpable change in the 
applicable law, but a change it is nonetheless. The variety of reactions to Lord 
Hoffmann’s approach in Investors Compensation Scheme provide some evidence that 
the propositions drawn in the decision have been perceived to have been far from 
insignificant.19 At the very least, Scots law can be said to have gone on something of 
a journey since the reception of Investors Compensation Scheme in Bank of Scotland 
v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd.20 and it may be that this voyage can be 
conceptualised as a process of doctrinal affiliation giving way to pragmatic 
inclinations. It is suggested that the current method is perhaps symptomatic of a legal 
system which is adapting its rules of construction to respond to ever longer and more 
complex commercial contracts in light of rapid economic and technological 
developments. Indeed, Investors Compensation Scheme has established something 
akin to a presumptional shift which is equivalent to a greater sub-conscious 
willingness to apply a contextual, rather than a formalistic and literal, analysis. If that 
is the minimum which has occurred, it is submitted that, in itself, it is noteworthy for 
the repercussions which it has for the significance of party consent and intention in 
this particular branch of Scots contract law.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Lord Bingham or Cornhill, “A New Thing Under the Sun” (2008) 12 Edinburgh 
Law Review 374-390. Lord Hope would perhaps disagree, on which see Multi-Link 
Leisure Developments Ltd. v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKSC 47; 2011 SLT 
184, 189 at para. [21]. 
19 See the reactions to the decision summarised by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in “A 
New Thing Under the Sun: The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, 381-388, referred to as ‘the hostile, ‘the wary’ 
and ‘the approving’. 
20 Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd, 1998 SC 657. 
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The Current Position 
 
The recent ‘shift’ in position in Scots law21 is vouchsafed by the judgment of Lord 
Philip in City Wall Properties (Scotland) Limited v Pearl Assurance plc: 
 
“… the court begins its consideration of the construction of a contractual 
provision already equipped with the information available as to the circumstances 
surrounding the contract, and that information is brought to bear on the court's 
consideration from the beginning. The court does not begin by looking at the 
words themselves, as it were in a vacuum, without reference to the surrounding 
circumstances, in order to ascertain whether they have a plain meaning or 
whether there is an ambiguity. To adopt that approach, it seems to me, is to 
assimilate so far as possible, the way in which the document is interpreted to the 
common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in 
ordinary life, and to discard “the old intellectual baggage of ‘legal’ interpretation”. 
If I am right in that interpretation, it was not necessary for the Lord Ordinary to 
decide that the words [in the contract] were ambiguous before he could deploy 
the evidence of the surrounding circumstances.”22 
                                                 
21 See the discussion in Review of Contract Law: Discussion Paper on Interpretation 
of Contract (Scot Law Com Discussion Paper No. 147) (2011) paras. 5.1 – 5.29 at pp. 
42-57 and in particular at paras. 5.13 – 5.15 at pp. 48-50. 
22 City Wall Properties (Scotland) Limited v Pearl Assurance plc [2007] CSIH 79 at 
para. [22]. Writer’s emphases in italics and annotations in square brackets. A similar 
approach was adopted in Waydale Ltd. v DHL Holdings (UK) Ltd. (No. 2). 2001 
S.L.T. 224, 228 per Lord Hamilton (the benefit of the rights of a landlord under a 
guarantee was held to transmit to singular successors based on the surrounding 
circumstances and the commercially sensible construction), Hardie Polymers Ltd. v 
Polymerland Ltd. 2002 S.C.L.R. 64, 74 per Lord Macfadyen (clause in an agency 
agreement headed ‘Compensation After termination’ held to confer a right to an 
indemnity in favour of an agent on termination based on the surrounding 
circumstances and the context of the clause and the contract as a whole), Howgate 
Shopping Centre Ltd. v GLS 164 Ltd. 2002 S.L.T. 820, Howgate Shopping Centre 
Ltd. v Catercraft Services Ltd. 2004 S.L.T. 231, 241 at para. [35] per Lord Macfadyen 
(discount to open market rental value for the purposes of a rent review enured for the 
benefit of the prior tenant and did not transmit to an assignee), MRS Distribution Ltd. 
v DS Smith (UK) Ltd. 2004 S.L.T. 631, Hutchison v Cameron 2005 S.C.L.R. 773, 
Royal Scottish Assurance v Scottish Equitable (No. 2) [2005] CSOH 08; 2005 GWD 
13-221 at para. [22] per Lord Bracadale, Emcor Drake & Scull Ltd. v Edinburgh 
Royal Joint Venture 2005 S.L.T.1233 at 1244–1245 per Lord Drummond Young, 
Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Ltd. [2010] CSIH 81; 2010 G.W.D. 
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It is also evident in the judgment of Lord Reed in Credential Bath Street Ltd v 
Venture Investment Placement Ltd.23 where his Lordship disapproved of the 
contention that words have a meaning outside their context and highlighted the fact 
that Lord Hoffmann’s approach had been followed many times by the House of 
Lords. Nevertheless, it has also been said that the court should not search for any 
ambiguity where the words have only one natural and ordinary meaning and are 
incapable of more than one interpretation.24 
 
Notwithstanding Lord Philip’s opinion in City Wall, there continue to be a great 
number of cases decided by the judiciary in Scotland subsequent to Investors 
Compensation Scheme where the courts have stipulated that it will not always be 
necessary to have resort to the surrounding circumstances on the basis that the words 
employed are unambiguous and have a natural and ordinary meaning.25 The most 
compelling example is the recent judgment of Sir David Edward, QC in the decision 
of the Inner House in Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd. v North Lanarkshire 
Council.26 Having doubted whether the contextual approach advanced by Lord 
Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme formed part of Scots law, Sir David 
Edward QC asserted that “Our inquiry should start (and will finish) by asking what is 
the ordinary meaning of the words used.”27 Affirming the decision of the Inner House 
in the Supreme Court,28 Lord Hope agreed that: “The court's task is to ascertain the 
intention of the parties by examining the words they used and giving them their 
                                                                                                                                            
37-755 (construction of ‘open market value’ of property in missives to be construed in 
light of commercial common sense rather than literally) and Green Island Organics 
Limited v QBE Insurance (Europe) Ltd. [2011] CSOH 15; 2011 GWD 6-173 at paras. 
[51]-[59] (provision in insurance contract construed in light of contract as a whole and 
commercially sensible construction). 
23 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 6-7 at paras. [15]-[17]. 
24 Warren James (Jewellers) Ltd. v Overgate Group Ltd. [2007] CSIH 14. This 
perhaps reflects an underlying judicial intolerance to the notion that ‘context’ can be 
deployed to dislodge the clear meaning of words to create a latent ambiguity and then 
subsequently re-applied to correct that latent ambiguity, see n 16 above. 
25 For a discussion of what ‘natural’, ‘plain’ or ‘ordinary’ meaning of words might 
mean in different contexts, see J. W. Carter and E. Peden, ‘The ‘Natural Meaning’ of 
Contracts’ (2005) 21 Journal of Contract Law 277. 
26 [2009] CSIH 96. 
27 [2009] CSIH 96 at para. [25].  
28 Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd. v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKSC 
47; 2011 SLT 184. 
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ordinary meaning in their contractual context… [and the court] must start with what… 
is given by the parties themselves when it is conducting this exercise.”29 Other cases 
in the same mould are Bank of Scotland v Frank James Junior,30 Loudonhill 
Contracts Ltd. v John Mowlem Construction Ltd.,31 Glasgow City Council v Caststop 
Ltd.,32 Atradius Credit Insurance NV v Whyte & Mackay Ltd.,33 Middlebank Ltd v 
University of Dundee,34 Autolink Concessionaires (M6) plc v Amey Construction 
Ltd.35 and Forbo-Nairn Ltd. v Murrayfield Properties Ltd..36 All of the 
aforementioned cases explicitly or impliedly rely on the judgment of Lord Rodger in 
Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd.37 In Dunedin Property 
Investment, Lord Rodger directed that he found it: “…helpful to start where Lord 
Mustill began…in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan…”38 In Charter Reinsurance 
Co Ltd v Fagan, Lord Mustill had stated: 
                                                 
29 Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd. v North Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKSC 
47; 2011 SLT 184, 187 at para. [11] per Lord Hope and writer’s emphases in italics 
and annotations in square brackets. However, having differed from the reasoning of 
the Extra Division of the Inner House in Multi-Link by holding that the wording in the 
contract under scrutiny in the case was indeed ambiguous and the product of poor 
drafting, Lord Hope subsequently went on to apply the commercially sensible 
construction to reach the same result as the Inner House, on which see [2010] UKSC 
47; 2011 SLT 184, per Lord Hope at [19]-[24]. Lord Rodger’s approach in Multi-Link 
differed from that of Lord Hope. Lord Rodger agreed with Lord Hope that the enquiry 
should start by focusing on the words employed in the contract, but that those words 
could then be deployed in order to make sense of other words in the contract which 
were opaque, on which see Multi-Link Leisure Developments Ltd. v North 
Lanarkshire Council [2010] UKSC 47; 2011 SLT 184, per Lord Rodger at [28]. 
30 Bank of Sctoland v Junior, 1999 S.C.L.R. 284, per Lord Penrose at 291. 
31 Loudonhill Contracts Ltd v John Mowlem Construction Ltd, 2000 S.C.L.R. 111, 
PER Lord Rodger at 115. 
32 Glasgow City Council v Caststop Ltd, 2002 SLT 47, 57 per Lord Macfadyen (OH) 
and Glasgow City Council v Caststop Ltd. 2003 S.L.T. 526 IH, per Lord Kirkwood at 
531C. 
33 Atradius Credit Insurance NV v Whyte & Mackay Ltd [2005] CSOH 23, per Lord 
Drummond Young at [43] 
34 Middlebank Ltd v University of Dundee [2006] CSOH 202, per Lord Drummond 
Young at [13]  
35 Autolink Concessionaires (M6) Plc v Amey Construction Ltd  [2009] CSIH 14, per 
Lord Kingarth at [23]  
36 Forbo-Nairn Ltd v Murrayfield Properties Ltd [2009] CSIH 94. 
37 Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd, 1998 SC 657 
38 Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd, 1998 SC 657 at 661. 
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“I believe that most expressions do have a natural meaning, in the sense of their 
meaning in ordinary speech…[t]he inquiry will start, and usually finish, by asking 
what is the ordinary meaning of the words used”.39   
 
The upshot of this analysis is that one might consider Scots law as possessing two 
(not necessarily opposing) streams of authority travelling in parallel directions. 
However, this would perhaps be stretching the true position too far, since whether a 
court adopts the first or the second approach is unlikely to make a great deal of 
difference to the outcome. Indeed, it is more the case that is: “A matter of choice 
whether a judge in his reasoning first analyses the background facts before 
considering the relevant contractual provisions or looks first at the provision before 
testing his view of it against those facts”.40 Nevertheless, on balance, it is submitted 
that the primacy of the surrounding circumstances and the application of the 
commercially sensible construction as the principal interpretative instruments is a 
paramount consideration, so that whilst the position in Scots law is not wholly free 
from doubt, the writer would adopt the description advanced by Macgregor which 
posits that: 
 
“… the Scottish courts no longer consider themselves absolutely bound to find an 
ambiguity prior to hearing evidence of the surrounding circumstances.”41  
 
Indeed, this view is shared by the Scottish Law Commission42 and as noted by Lord 
Hodge in Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group plc & Mean Fiddler Holdings 
                                                 
39 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Fagan [1997] AC 313 at 384.  
40 Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v MAMA Group plc [2010] CSIH 01; 2010 S.C. 310, per 
Lord Hodge at [38]. 
41 See L. Macgregor and C. Lewis, “Interpretation of Contract”, in R. Zimmermann, 
D. Visser and K. Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective 
(Oxford, OUP, 2004), Chap. 3 at p. 81. 
42 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (Scot 
Law Com Discussion Paper No. 147) (2011) paras. 5.14 – 5.15 at pp. 49-50. In asking 
consultees for their views in Review of Contract Law: Discussion Paper on 
Interpretation of Contract (Scot Law Com Discussion Paper No. 147) (2011) para. 
7.9 at p. 72, the Scottish Law Commission appear to have presented a rule whereby 
‘ambiguity in expression would not be a pre-requisite for consideration of the 
surrounding circumstances’ as their preferred option for law reform. 
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Ltd.,43 the end result is that the factual matrix, surrounding circumstances and 
commercially sensible construction all operate at the forefront of the interpretative 
process rather than lurking somewhere towards the background. 
 
What is the distinction between a subjective and objective approach? 
 
At this juncture, it is perhaps beneficial to pause, take a step back and subject the 
distinction between a subjective and objective approach to much closer scrutiny.44 
The oft-versed assertion, which one would suggest is more of a caricature than a 
reality, is that legal systems based on the civilian tradition such as Germany,45 
France46 and Italy47 are more subjective in their approach to contractual interpretation 
than common law systems such as England. The inquiry is concerned with revealing 
the personal intent of the parties in accordance with the will theory. However, such a 
clichéd observation does a disservice to the subtlety of the interpretative approaches 
harnessed in legal systems grounded in the Civilian tradition. As Professors 
Vogenauer,48 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston49 have accurately observed, the 
                                                 
43 Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd c MAMA Group Plc [2010] CSIH 01; 2010 S.C. 310, 319 
at para. [38]: 
“… I see no error in law in the Lord Ordinary’s approach of considering first 
the words in question and then reassessing his view of them after having 
regard to the relevant background circumstances. It is not part of our law of 
contract that the court can have regard to relevant background circumstances 
only if there is ambiguity in the words of an agreement. The Lord Ordinary is 
supported by Lord Mustil’s view, which he quotes, that in most cases “the 
enquiry will start, and usually finish, by asking what is the ordinary meaning 
of the words used” – Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 at 
p.384B-C.” 
44 See the discussion in S Vogenauer “Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding  
Comparative Observations” in A Burrows and E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms (Oxford,  
OUP, 2007) 123, 125-129. 
45 Buergerliches Gesetzbuch art.133: “When a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is 
necessary to ascertain the true intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of 
the declaration.” 
46 Code Civile arts. 1156-1165: “One must in agreements seek what the common 
intention of the contracting parties was, rather than pay attention to the literal meaning 
of the terms.” 
47 Codice Civile arts. 1362-1367: “In interpreting contracts, one must ascertain what 
was the common intention of the parties and one must not limit oneself to a 
consideration of the literal meaning of the words deployed.” 
48 Vogenauer “Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding Comparative Observations” 
in A Burrows and E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 123, 149-150. 
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divide between civil law and common law systems is not as clearcut as might first 
appear.50 Thus, it is somewhat artificial to talk of legal systems as having a 100 per 
cent subjective or objective measure of scrutiny. Nevertheless, constructing the 
indicators and hallmarks of such polar opposites is useful inasmuch as it enables a 
spectrum to be drawn, against which the approaches of Scots law and other legal 
systems can be plotted.  To that extent, it is submitted that a purely subjective 
assessment would enjoin a court to consider what the parties individually or 
collectively intended to say in complete ignorance of the terms or words deployed. In 
this context, as Lord Reed noted in Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment 
Placement Ltd., it is crucial to recognise the distinction between the individual and 
collective intentions of the parties.51 A search for the former would be undertaken by 
definition in isolation of the other contracting parties’ intentions which is particularly 
unsound. Further, the interpretative process in Scots law has never involved the search 
for the former nor the latter in the absence of consideration of the words used. 
However, an examination of the latter in light of the terms of the written instrument 
did indeed pertain at one time under the leitmotif of the ‘mutual intention of the 
parties’.  
 
A 100 per cent subjective examination can be contrasted with a purely objective 
approach. In strict terms, a determination which is 100 per cent objective would 
empower the court to substitute its own judgment as to what was expressed for that of 
the parties. In terms of this formula, the court would second guess the judgment or 
intentions of the parties. A particularly emphatic description of an objective test was 
expounded by Rix LJ in Socimer International Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Standard 
Bank London Ltd.52 where he stated that on the application of an objective standard, 
‘the decision maker becomes the court itself’. A purely objective examination would 
                                                                                                                                            
49 B.S. Markesinis, H Unberath, A Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise, 2nd edition (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 136. 
50 See also Scottish Law Commission, Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com 
No. 160) (1997) para. 1.18 at p.5 and E. Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. 
Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 
2, Chap. 2 at pp. 47-49 and 70-71. 
51 Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd. 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 
9 at para. [28]. 
52 Socimer International Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd (No. 
2) [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 558, at [66]. 
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also empower the court to completely disregard the views and understandings of the 
contracting parties themselves. In such an extreme case, party autonomy, consent and 
intention would be completely overridden and it is clear that this is not what is 
happening where the current rules of interpretation are applied by the courts. At this 
juncture, it should also be noted that if one were to chart the subjective/objective 
spectrum, this would not coincide with another spectrum ranging from a 100 per cent 
literal construction at one end of the scale to a 100 per cent contextual approach at the 
other end (insofar as it is possible to conceive of the interpretative process as flowing 
seamlessly in terms of such a spectrum at all). The subjective approach does not entail 
consideration of the text in isolation, but rather the process can be conceived as an 
exercise in delving into the heads of the contracting parties and identifying their 
genuine and honest beliefs. Likewise, whilst the application of an objective approach 
enjoins a court to engage with the context, this is not so radical as to grant a licence to 
the court to ignore the text of the contract. Instead, it is suggested that the relationship 
between subjective, objective, literal and contextual approaches is more subtle and 
can be drawn in terms of an irregularly shaped trapezium, which might be plotted in 
the following manner: 
      
 
 
 
 
      
 
 14 
The question which arises is where the Scots law approach to contractual 
interpretation is located on the subjective/objective spectrum painted above. The 
answer is that it probably lies somewhere towards the right of the median, since it 
would be absurd to contend that the current law is devoid of any subjective 
considerations. Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of the scrutiny applied 
by a court is to conceptualise it as involving the application of a ‘strong’ objective 
measure duly tempered by a ‘weak’ subjective strand. The approach is best 
understood as one which clings to a mixed subjective/objective approach since it is 
subjective to the extent that the focus on the surrounding circumstances relates to 
factors which pertained to the contracting parties at the time of formation and it is 
objective inasmuch as those factors are examined in light of what they would have 
meant to the reasonable business person ‘aware of the commercial context in which 
the contract occurs’.53 Thus, the court is not applying its own judgment as to what 
was stated and overriding party consent, intention or autonomy. Rather, it is reaching 
a conclusion based objectively on what a reasonable business person stepping into the 
shoes of the parties would have considered to be the appropriate construction. A 
related critique of the approach of Scots law to construction is that the wider the scope 
of the ‘surrounding circumstances’ and the greater the importance afforded to the 
technique of the ‘commercially sensible construction’,54 the more objective the 
process becomes and the greater the licence given to the judiciary to be creative. This 
may appear to be accurate, but it should not be taken too far or at face value, since the 
creativity of the courts is constrained by the aforementioned subjective element 
inherent within the process and as noted by Lord Drummond Young in MRS 
Distribution Ltd. v DS Smith (UK) Ltd.55 the validity of such an argument is 
somewhat marginalised by the very nature of the Scottish system of written pleadings 
and other subjective interpretative factors which will be considered in more detail 
below. 
                                                 
53 Melville Dundas Ltd. v Hotel Corporation of Edinburgh Ltd. 2007 SC 12, 23 at 
para. [17] per Lord Drummond Young. 
54 The commercial reality approach may be a tributary of the rule that absurd 
meanings are rejected, see L. Macgregor and C. Lewis, “Interpretation of Contract”, 
in R. Zimmermann, D. Visser and K. Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford, OUP, 2004), Chap. 3 at p. 91 and W. W. 
McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edition, Edinburgh W Green 2007) 
para. 8-12 at p. 202. 
55 MRS Distribution Ltd v DS Smith (UK) Ltd, 2004 S.L.T. 631 at [14]  
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Does the current objective approach encroach upon the territory traditionally 
reserved to other rules or areas of contract law? 
 
One might argue that the modern contextual approach which is applied towards 
contractual interpretation has serious repercussions for other legal principles, rule and 
doctrines of contract law. If this is so, one must ask what the implications may be for 
party consent and autonomy. Generally, it may appear that the objective approach acts 
as a territorial aggressor in such a fashion, but, on balance, it is submitted that in most 
cases, it does not. First, an issue which emerges is whether the law of contractual 
interpretation encroaches upon the territory which is the traditional and natural habitat 
of the law of error. For example, in the case of Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture 
Investment Placement Ltd.,56 Lord Reed noted that the interpretative process can be 
deployed to identify mistakes in expression contained in contracts and apply a 
construction which is consistent with the parties’ shared meaning, but which may 
differ from the terms of the clause as drafted. One might argue that this is precisely 
what Lord Reed appears to have done in the case of Macdonald Estates plc v 
Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd.57 The Regenesis case concerned a joint venture 
entered into between a property owner and a property developer. In terms of a 
management services agreement (“MSA”), it was provided that the joint venture 
company (“JVCo”) would ‘free and relieve [the property developer] on demand of all 
outlays reasonably required to be made by it as an incident of the performance of its 
obligations … and the provision of the Services.’ Thus, on the face of it, the MSA 
directed that the JVCo was bound to indemnify the property developer in respect of 
all reasonably incurred costs, including those which the JVCo had made in connection 
with the Services provided by the property developer to the JVCo. Nevertheless, Lord 
Reed concluded that: 
 
“The words “it” and “its” [in the MSA] must be a mistake: the [JVCo] could 
not sensibly be undertaking to relieve the [property developer] of outlays 
                                                 
56 Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd [2007] Hous. L.R. 
at [17]-[24]. 
57 Macdonald Estates Plc v Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd [2007] CSOH 123; 
2007 S.L.T. 791. 
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which the [JVCo] had themselves made. Those words must be understood as 
meaning ‘you’ and ‘your.’”58  
 
Thus, one might contend that the inherent power of the court to rectify mistakes 
through the process of interpretation appears to invade the territory occupied by the 
law of error in consent. However, the present writer would reject such a view. First, 
there is abundant evidence that the courts have always been prepared to treat words as 
pro non scripto or substitute words where there has clearly been a mistake in the 
drafting. Traditionally, this has been treated as part of the package of responsibilities 
discharged by the rules of contractual interpretation.59 Secondly, and more 
significantly, to adopt such a position confuses the distinction between the law of 
error in consent where the parties have effectively concluded no agreement and the 
situation where agreement has been reached, but a clerical mistake has been made in 
the drafting – which is the case here. For that reasoning, arguments about the 
marginalisation of the role of the law of error in consent are unconvincing and miss 
the point. 
 
A second, related argument is that the more contextual approach to construction 
operates to narrow the rule that the courts cannot use their powers to substitute, add or 
interpolate words in contracts. Does the Investors Compensation Scheme contextual 
approach inflict some degree of intrusive surgery on this rule? Here, the judgment of 
Lord Reed in Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd.60 is 
instructive. Lord Reed recognised that it would be rare for a court to substitute, add or 
interpolate words on the basis (a) that to do so would render the clause or contract 
more commercially sensible or (b) of the surrounding circumstances. The rationale for 
such an approach is that the contract may simply amount to a bad bargain from which 
a party should not be saved on fairness grounds. The courts will not rewrite a contract 
for the parties, and in the words of Lord Hoffmann in Att. Gen. of Belize v Belize 
                                                 
58 Macdonald Estates Plc v Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd [2007] CSOH 123; 
2007 S.L.T. 791 at [114]. Writer’s annotations in square brackets. 
59 See the discussion by W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd 
edition, Edinburgh W Green 2007) para. 8-98 – 8-99 at pp. 236-237. 
60 Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd [2007] Hous. L.R. 
2, per Lord Reed at paras. [24]-[25], [36-37]. 
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Telecom Ltd.,61 in such a case, ‘the loss lies where it falls.’62 Nevertheless, the 
objective construction may be harnessed to empower a court to substitute, replace, 
add or interpolate words where in the words of Lord Hoffmann in Investors 
Compensation Scheme, “something must have gone wrong with the language” or that 
the natural reading of the clause would “attribute to the parties an intention which 
they plainly could not have had.”63 One might also refer to the speech of Lord 
Diplock in The Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (The Antaios), 
where his Lordship opined that where the natural reading of the words produces “a 
conclusion that flouts business commonsense”,64 the contextual approach may be 
deployed to add or interpolate words.65 Furthermore, in Hombourg Houtimport BV v 
Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin), Lord Bingham observed that words may be added 
or interpolated where “it is clear … that words have been omitted.”66 The language 
employed by Lords Hoffmann, Diplock and Bingham demonstrate that recourse to the 
raw tools of contractual interpretation to add or subtract terms or words will be rare 
indeed, since the threshold is set at a particularly high level. For that reason, it is 
submitted that the successful application of such a technique will be exceptional 
which renders it unlikely that the interpretative process will be applied as a means of 
overriding the shared intention of the parties. 
Another more compelling argument is that the current rules on contractual 
interpretation function to narrow the scope of relevance of the law of rectification. 
The wider the scope of the interpretative task, the greater the ineffectiveness of the 
statutory provisions on rectification.67 The contention is that the once neat and clean 
dividing line which existed between the role of the law of construction as an 
                                                 
61 Att Gen of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988 
62 Att Gen of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988 at 
1993D. 
63 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 
WLR, 896 at 912–913. 
64 Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (The Antaios) [1985] AC 19 
at 201. 
65 See also Hombourg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 
A.C. 715, per Lord Bingham at [23] 
66 Hombourg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2004] 1 A.C. 715, 
at [23] 
67 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 8(1(a). See also G. 
McMeel, “The Principles and Policies of Contractual Construction” in A Burrows and 
E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms, 2007, pp.27, 35-36 and A Burrows, “Construction and 
Rectification” in A Burrows and E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms, 2007, p.77. 
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interpretative endeavour and the role of the law of rectification as performing a 
corrective and adaptive function appears to have collapsed. However, the very least 
that can be said at this point is that the techniques of construction and rectification 
cannot be distinguished by invoking the subjective/objective continuum which was 
explored above: It would be erroneous to assert that construction is more concerned 
about discovering the meaning which the terms of a document would convey to a 
reasonable and objective business outsider standing in the shoes of the contracting 
parties, whereas rectification is about the correction of defective expressions as a 
means of realising the subjective ‘common’68 and ‘actual (not deemed)’69 intentions 
of the contracting parties. Instead, if the two processes of construction and 
rectification were to be plotted on the subjective/objective spectrum, they would both 
be marked off at corresponding locations, since both entail the application of 
objective elements.70  
 
Finally, there is considerable force in the assertion that the current interpretative 
process is not only influencing, but indeed usurping, the traditional role fulfilled by 
the rules on the implication of terms. In 1999, Sean Smith, advocate opined: 
 
“The problem with [the approach in Investors Compensation Scheme] is that it 
appears to stray uncomfortably away from interpretation, strictly speaking, 
and towards the implication of terms... [and the] result [is] that the distinction 
between interpretation and implication becomes blurred.”71 
                                                 
68 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 8(1(a). 
69 See Shaw v William Grant (Minerals) Ltd. 1989 SLT 121n, 121 per Lord 
McCluskey. The soundness of Lord McCluskey’s subjective approach was doubted 
by Lord Reed in Macdonald Estates plc v Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd. 2007 
SLT 791, 822-823 at paras. [161]-[165]. 
70 For example, in Rehman v Ahmad 1993 SLT 741, 752 Lord Penrose was of the 
view that the adoption by the legislature of the words ‘common intention’ in the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 8(1(a) enjoined the court 
to apply an objective approach. In Macdonald Estates plc v Regenesis (2005) 
Dunfermline Ltd. 2007 SLT 791, 822-823 at paras. [161]-[165] Lord Reed adopted 
the ‘provisional view’ (rather than conclusive opinion) that Lord Penrose’s approach 
in Rehman was sound. See also Brown v Rysaffe Trustee Company (CI) Ltd. [2011] 
CSOH 26 at para. [34] per Lord Glennie. 
71 S C Smith, “Making Sense of Contracts” 1999 SLT (News) 307, 310-311. See also 
K. Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 4th edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2007) 196-198. 
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Of course, if true, this is problematic, since the threshold for the implication of terms 
is one of necessity,72 whereas the threshold for interpretation of terms is 
reasonableness, i.e. the ‘reasonable business person’. Here, there is a discrepancy in 
the relevant standard, despite the fact that the width of enquiry which is required 
pursuant to the contextual approach to construction strays over into the process of 
implication. Moreover, since the recent decision of the Privy Council in Attorney 
General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd.,73it is submitted that matters have become 
even more obscured and it is arguable that the roles of construction and implication 
have travelled further down the road towards outright conflation. The advice of the 
board was delivered by Lord Hoffmann who opined that both the construction and 
implication of terms necessitated an objective enquiry. The following excerpt from 
the Board’s judgment delivered by Lord Hoffmann repays careful consideration: 
 
“…the Board will make some general observations about the process of 
implication. The court has no power to improve upon the instrument which it 
is called upon to construe, whether it be a contract, a statute or articles of 
association. It cannot introduce terms to make it fairer or more reasonable. It is 
concerned only to discover what the instrument means. However, that 
meaning is not necessarily or always what the authors or parties to the 
document would have intended. It is the meaning which the instrument would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which 
would reasonably be available to the audience to whom the instrument is 
addressed: see Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
                                                 
72 For implied terms in fact, see The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, 68, Liverpool City 
Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 258B-C per Lord Cross, William Morton & Co. v 
Muir Brothers & Co. 1907 SC 1211, 1224 per Lord M’Laren, McWhirter v Longmuir 
1948 SC 577, 589 per Lord Jamieson and J & H Ritchie Ltd. v Lloyd Ltd. 2007 SC 
(HL) 89, 94-95 per Lord Hope. For the minimum that is required to imply terms in 
law into a particular contract, see Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. [1957] AC 
555, 576 per Viscount Simonds, Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 255 
per Lord Wilberforce, Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1991] 
IRLR 522, 525 at para. [12] per Lord Bridge, Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc 
[1995] 2 A.C. 296, 339 and 354 per Lords Bridge and Oliver respectively; Johnson v 
Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279, 286 at para [35] per Lord Hoffmann; Reid v Rush and 
Tompkins Group plc [1989] IRLR 265, 269 per Gibson LJ and Tai Hing Cotton Mill 
Ltd. v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. [1986] AC 80, 104–105 per Scarman LJ and Gloag, 
Contract (2nd edn, 1929) 286. 
73 Att Gen of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988 
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Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912—913. It is this objective meaning which is 
conventionally called the intention of the parties, or the intention of 
Parliament, or the intention of whatever person or body was or is deemed to 
have been the author of the instrument.”74 
 
Whilst the above passage could fuel a further academic paper by itself, duly exploring 
its implications for the relationship between the processes of construction and 
implication, the writer would prefer not to deviate from the principal theme of 
consent. In that vein, it is particularly noteworthy that the endeavour pursued in the 
context of the implication of terms is about ascertaining the ‘presumed intention’ of 
the parties,75 rather than the actual intentions of the parties which it has been 
suggested is the purpose of the law of rectification.76 For that reason, it is contended 
that the obfuscation of the threshold between the process of construction and 
implication of terms inflicts no harm upon the central notions of consent, autonomy 
and intention in contract law. 
 
Does the current objective approach foster unwarranted judicial creativity and 
the marginalisation of party consent, intention and autonomy? 
 
The current approach to contractual interpretation adopted by the Scottish courts 
places great importance on the background knowledge which was, or ought 
reasonably to have been, available to the parties, the circumstances surrounding the 
inception of the contract, the whole matrix of facts and the commercially sensible 
construction. These factors undoubtedly enjoin a court to apply an objective measure 
of scrutiny to their task at hand. However, as has already been noted, this is duly 
constrained by the subjective element referred to above, i.e. the need for the objective 
business outsider to step into the shoes of the contracting parties. The courts’ 
interpretative task is further tempered by subjective factors which may or may not be 
                                                 
74 Att Gen of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1988 at 
1993A-C 
75 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 266E per Lord Edmund-Davies and 
Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd. [2009] 1 WLR 1988, 1993C (PC) 
per Lord Hoffmann. See also K. Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 4th edn. 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 191 and 194. 
76 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd. v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337, 
per Mason J. at [5] 
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appropriate to consider or consult depending on the facts of the case. For example, 
where the parties have adopted a ‘private dictionary’, the subjective meaning 
understood by the parties must be applied by the courts.77 A similar rule is that special 
or technical words or terms should be construed according to that special or technical 
sense where this is the meaning understood by the parties.78 Furthermore, terms which 
are understood as having a particular meaning through custom and usage ought to 
yield to that construction.79  
 
However, the hostility of the courts to the admissibility of documents which are 
reflective of the pre-contractual understandings of the parties, which was recently re-
asserted by Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd.80 does limit 
the scope to which subjective factors will be taken into account. Likewise, the rule 
against the admissibility of evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties as an aid 
to construction81 arguably achieves the same effect. Here, adopting the approach of 
Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd.,82 evidential materials 
such as pre-contractual communings or subsequent conduct are categorised as being 
indicative of subjective, rather than objective factors. Interestingly, academic, judicial 
and practitioner commentators have indicated that the principle against the 
admissibility of subsequent conduct is one which is difficult to sustain and which is 
ripe for reform.83 Indeed, continental jurisdictions84 harbour no concerns in relation to 
                                                 
77 McBryde, Contract, 2007, para. 8-50. 
78 Gloag, Contract (2nd edn, 1929) 365 and 400. This is an old rule, e.g. see Coutts & 
Co. (1758) Mor. 11549, Carricks v Saunders (1850) 12 D 812 and 922. A more 
modern example is Leverstop Ltd v Starling 1993 GWD 23-1461. 
79 Gloag, Contract, 1929 pp.378-381. This is probably an aspect of the rule that 
technical words should be given a technical meaning. 
80 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Home Lts [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101. 
81 Cameron (Scotland) Ltd v Melville Dundas Ltd 2001 SCLR 691, 695-696 at paras. 
[27]-[31] per Lord Hamilton, Westbury Estates Ltd. v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 
2006 SLT 1143, 1151 at para. [38] per Lord Reed and Ballast plc v Laurieston 
Properties Ltd. (In Liquidation) and others [2005] CSOH 16 at paras. [157]-[159] per 
Lady Paton. 
82 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Home Lts [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101 at 
[38] 
83 J. Steyn, “The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts” (2003) 
Sydney Law Review 5, 10, G. McMeel, “Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct-
The Next Step Forward for Contractual Interpretation?” (2003) 119 Law Quarterly 
Review 272, 293-297, D. (Lord) Nicholls, “My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of 
Words” (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 577, 586 and 588-589, T. Bingham, “A 
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the admissibility of such subsequent actings and neither does the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference.85 Here, I would echo the sentiments of Lord Bingham to the 
effect that ‘I would not put money on [the] survival [of the rule against admitting 
evidence of subsequent conduct]’.86 Another difficulty lies in drawing the line 
between evidence which amounts to ‘pre-contractual negotiations’, which of course, 
is inadmissible and evidence which forms part of the surrounding circumstances or 
the parties’ background knowledge, which indeed may be had regard to by a court.87 
Lord Hoffmann has attempted to argue that the threshold criterion between the two 
categories is equivalent to the distinction between objective and subjective material, 
i.e. that the surrounding circumstances are objective, whereas prior communings are 
‘drenched in subjectivity’.88 It is submitted that this appears to be a rather blunt and 
simplistic approach which may break down at the margins.89 The same challenge of 
establishing a threshold criterion exists in drawing the distinction between evidence of 
subsequent conduct and surrounding circumstances.90 These classificatory issues will 
                                                                                                                                            
New Thing Under the Sun: The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, 390 and D. McLauchlan, “Contract 
Interpretation: What is it About?” (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 5, 42-47. 
84 Codice Civile, Art. 1362: “In order to ascertain the common intention of the parties, 
one must assess the totality of their conduct, including conduct subsequent to the 
contract”. 
85 Christian von Bar and Eric Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Munich: Sellier, 2009).  
86 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, “A New Thing Under the Sun” (2008) 12 Edin. L.R. 
374, 390 
87 See Reardon Smith Line v Hansen-Tagen [1976] WLR 989 at 995H per Lord 
Wilberforce, Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd. 1998 SC 657 
at 665 per Lord Rodger, Howgate Shopping Centre Ltd. v GLS 164 Ltd. 2002 SLT 
820, 825 at para. [23] per Lord Macfadyen, City Wall Properties (Scotland) Ltd. v 
Pearl Assurance plc [2007] CSIH 79 at para. [22] per Lord Phillip and Luminar Lava 
Ignite Ltd v Mama Group & Mean Fiddler [2009] CSOH 68, 2009 GWD 19-305 at 
para. [14] per Lord Glennie. Recently, it has been endorsed resoundingly by Lord 
Hoffman in the House of Lords in Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] 
UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101, 1117F-1119F at paras. [33]-[38]. 
88 See Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 
1101, 1119B-F at para. [38]. See also the approach in Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v 
Mama Group plc & Mean Fiddler Holdings Ltd. [2010] CSIH 01; 2010 SC 310, 320-
321 at paras. [41]-[45] per Lord Hodge. 
89 See the discussion in Review of Contract Law: Discussion Paper on Interpretation 
of Contract (Scot Law Com Discussion Paper No. 147) (2011) para. 5.19 at p. 52. 
90 See Cameron (Scotland) Ltd v Melville Dundas Ltd 2001 SCLR 691, 695-696 at 
paras. [30]-[31] per Lord Hamilton and Wincanton Group Ltd v Reid Furniture plc 
[2008] CSOH; 2008 GWD 29-446, at para. [16] per Lord Glennie. 
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continue to exist so long as material which is labelled as prior communings and 
subsequent conduct is deemed to be an irrelevant consideration. Indeed, in its recent 
Discussion Paper, the stance of the Scottish Law Commission was consistent with the 
abolition of the ban on pre-contractual communings and subsequent actings.91 
 
The question which remains is the extent to which interpretative techniques such as 
the surrounding circumstances, factual matrix, background knowledge and the 
commercially sensible construction which are comprised within the objective measure 
of scrutiny lead to unwarranted and excessive judicial creativity. The writer’s answer 
to this question is clear: On balance the current approach does not foster or promote 
excessive judicial creativity or the narrowing of the importance or role of party 
autonomy. The justifications for this view are that the presence of subjective factors 
are sufficiently powerful to (i) offset the effects caused by the inadmissibility of 
subjective elements such as prior communings and subsequent conduct and (ii) chisel 
away at some of the creative urges which the overall objective theory of contractual 
interpretation may tempt the judiciary into applying. A related point to be addressed is 
whether the dynamics of the objective approach empower the courts to re-write 
contracts leading to the elision of party consent and autonomy? It is suggested that 
there is no uniform response to this question which holds in all cases and the writer is 
sceptical or at best, agnostic, about the prescience of any accusation that party consent 
is marginalised by the objective and contextual approach. Since legal formalism in 
this area of law has been rejected, different interpretative techniques will be afforded 
precedence in various cases. As argued by the writer before,92 it is counter-productive 
to conceptualise the objective approach in terms of fixed rules espousing a hierarchy 
of interpretative criteria. Instead, the author is of the view that how the range of 
interpretative criteria are applied from case to case ought to be understood in terms of 
a casuistic, rather than dogmatically rigid process, with the relevant criterion or 
criteria selected being dependent on its or their relevancy to the interpretative 
endeavour in a given case. For example, the application of a commercially sensible 
construction may be wholly inapposite where the contract captures a non-commercial 
                                                 
91 See Review of Contract Law: Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (Scot 
Law Com Discussion Paper No. 147) (2011) paras. 7.15 and 7.18 at pp. 74-76. 
92 D. Cabrelli, “The Effect of Past and Subsisting Breaches on Contractual Rights” 
[2009] 13 Edinburgh Law Review 293. 
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arrangement. In such circumstances, the appropriate response may be to attach greater 
weight to the surrounding circumstances or alternatively, the text itself. In another 
case, the surrounding circumstances may reveal little, yet the commercial objective of 
a clause may be clear.93 A further possibility is that both criteria may prove to shed no 
light whatsoever, in which case, the natural and ordinary meaning of the words will be 
applied. In such matters, the dynamics can be summarised in the layperson’s motif of 
‘horses for courses’. Furthermore, a natural rein ought also to be placed on any 
potential excessive judicial creativity by the need to confine the scope of enquiries to 
the matters averred and narrated in the parties’ written pleadings and the need for the 
court to adopt a construction which is reflective of the understanding of the 
reasonable person who has stepped into the shoes of the parties. Where two 
competing interpretations are equally plausible, the requirement to adopt the persona 
of the objective reasonable person should channel the court towards a process which 
examines their relative workability and the construction which is more workable than 
the other should be preferred.94 
 
However, the above is subject to a particular caveat. That is to say that the 
interpretative tool of the ‘commercially sensible construction’ may be a double-edged 
sword. A liberal deployment of such an instrument may lead to the elision of the 
significance of compromise if it is acknowledged that it represents a facet of consent 
and party autonomy. In Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement 
Ltd.,95 Forbo-Nairn Ltd. v Murrayfield Properties Ltd.,96 G4S Cash Centres (UK) Ltd 
v Clydesdale Bank plc97 and MacIntyre House Ltd. v Maritsan Developments Ltd.,98 
Lords Reed, Hodge and Menzies highlighted the fact that the courts need to be alive 
to the danger that the commercially sensible construction might be applied to 
                                                 
93 For example, see Trygort (Number 2) Limited v UK Home Finance Ltd. [2008] 
CSIH 56, 2008 SLT 1065. 
94 Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group plc & Mean Fiddler Holdings Ltd. [2010] 
CSIH 01; 2010 SC 310, per Lord Eassie at [15] 
95 Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd [2007] Hous. L.R. 
2, per Lord Reed at [36]-[37] 
96 [2009] CSOH 47, per Lord Hodge at [13]. The case of Forbo-Nairn Ltd. v 
Murrayfield Properties Ltd. [2009] CSIH 94 was appealed to the Inner House, but the 
Inner House did not overturn Lord Reed’s decision. 
97 G4S Cach Centres (UK) Ltd v Clydesdale Bank Plc [2010] CSOH 133; 2010 
G.W.D. 38-771 at [28].  
98 Macintyre House Lyd v Maritsan Developments Ltd [2011] CSOH 45 at [34]. 
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supersede a bad bargain which has been agreed by a party through the dynamics of 
compromise and concession in the commercial negotiation process.99 The writer 
would also add that this danger is compounded by the fact that the scope for 
concession and compromise to be revealed in court is constrained since evidence of 
pre-contractual negotiations continues to be inadmissible post-Chartbrook Ltd. v 
Persimmon Homes Ltd.100 For this reason alone, the writer is in favour of the lifting of 
the embargo on pre-contractual negotiations. This would enable direct evidence of 
concessions and compromise to be pleaded which would circumscribe the potential 
for the commercially sensible construction to operate as an ‘unruly horse’. 
 
One example where it is perfectly possible (but not certain) that the commercially 
sensible construction may have superseded an express term which found its way into 
the contract through concession and compromise is the case of Macdonald Estates plc 
v Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd.101 Here, one will recall that it was held that 
where a property owner had agreed to pay a property developer a fee for certain 
Services, some of which it would require sub-contractors to perform, it made no 
commercial sense for the terms of the contract to be construed in a manner which also 
required the property owner to reimburse the property developer in respect of 
professional and other costs which the property developer had incurred in employing 
third parties. Here, there is an argument that Lord Reed may have engaged the 
interpretative construct of the ‘commercially sensible construction’ in a manner which 
may have (i) departed from the commercial realities of the property development 
market or (ii) overlooked the fact that what appeared to be an onerous commitment 
may well have been conceded in return for agreement on another or more important 
provision of the same contract. For example, it would be unusual for a property 
developer to engage in-house professionals and consultants and so it was more or less 
inevitable that it would have to instruct outside third parties for professional advice. 
To that extent, it may have been wholly legitimate for the JVCo to agree to indemnify 
                                                 
99 A matter also noted by the Scottish Law Commission in Review of Contract Law: 
Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract, 2011, para. 5.16 and in particular at 
paras. 5.13 – 5.15. 
100 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101. 
Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group plc & Mean Fiddler Holdings Ltd. [2010] 
CSIH 01; 2010 S.C. 310, per Lord Hodge at [40]. 
101 Macdonald Estates Plc v Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd, 2007 SLT 791. 
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the property developer in respect of such costs, duly reflecting the realities of the 
marketplace.102  
 
An alternative objection to the prominence of the commercially sensible construction 
is that it assumes that the judiciary are sufficiently equipped to engage in commercial 
decision-making. It is suggested that this may be somewhat misplaced, something 
which the judiciary themselves have not been inhibited from reminding themselves in 
the past.103 The writer would submit that the risk is that the construct of the 
commercially sensible construction develops into something of an ‘unruly horse’ 
which cannot be reined in once the stable door has bolted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons advanced in this paper, it is contended that the adoption of an 
increasingly objective approach towards the construction of contracts is not 
necessarily consistent with the marginalisation of the importance of the role of 
consent in contract law. However, this is subject to the peril that the commercially 
sensible construction may evolve into something which overshadows the other 
interpretative tools and operates to suppress the significance of consent articulated 
through concession and compromise. An altogether different and more pressing issue 
is the effect of the current approach to construction upon commercial certainty. 
Amongst legal practitioners104 and law and economics scholars,105 the current 
objective approach is less than popular for the uncertainty and inefficiencies which it 
generates in commercial contracting.106 The writer would end with the simple 
                                                 
102 I am thankful to my colleague Laura Macgregor for the identification of this point. 
103 Chiswell Shipping and Liberian Jaguar Transports Inc v National Iranian Tankers 
Co (The World Symphony and The World Reknown) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 115, per 
Lord Donaldson MR at 117; Capital Land Holdings Ltd. v Secretary of State for the 
Environment Unreported 16 May 1995 OH, per Lord Penrose; Credential Bath Street 
Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd [2007] CSOH 208; Hous. L.R. 2 at para. 
[24]. 
104 R. Calnan, “Construction of Commercial Contracts: A Practitioner’s Perspective” 
In Contract Terms, 2007, pp.18-20 
105 Schwartz and Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law” 113 Yale 
L.J. 541. 
106 A suggestion worthy of consideration is whether the relationship between certainty 
and formation, interpretation, implication of terms and rectification in contract law 
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observation that there is an air of inevitability about the emergence of more objective 
criteria such as the commercially sensible construction and surrounding circumstances 
as the dynamics of the commercial contracting process becomes more and more 
complex and influenced by technology. That is to say, that the prevalence of 
subjective criteria are inversely proportional to the complexity of contracts.107 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
might represent a fruitful source of discussion and debate amongst academics, 
practitioners and members of the judiciary at a future workshop or conference. 
107 See the discussion in G. McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, 
Implication and Rectification (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), para. 1.77; 
Scottish Law Commission, Interpretation in Private Law, 1997, paras. 1.15, 1.18; 
Clive, “Interpretation”, in A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2000, vol. 2, p.49. 
